The behaviour of third-party strategic sensors, specifically the effort expended to collect measurements in response to incentives, are modelled in terms of a contract game which is exploited in a simple averaging estimation scheme. Conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of the corresponding equilibrium are presented. The equilibrium is constructed explicitly and its properties in response to the incentives are studied. Following this, optimal contracts are designed from the perspective of the budget required for accurate information acquisition and sensing.
Introduction
The number of networked platforms, from smart phones to wearable gadgets, has increased at a staggering rate in the last few years. By some estimates, it is envisaged that by 2020 there will be 40.9 billion networked devices [1] . The ubiquity of networked devices has enabled us to construct large-scale systems with building blocks owned by various entities. Examples of such systems are crowd-sensing applications in which registered participants provide measurements of a variable of interest, such as traffic condition and quality of service, to construct accurate estimates. This, however, opens many doors to strategic manipulation of the measurements due to privacy concerns [2] , conflicts of interest [3] , or security issues [4] . Many studies have speculated the use of monetary rewards to provide appropriate incentives to the participants, e.g., [5] . However, there are several concerns that need to be addressed before adopting such mechanisms. For instance, if the rewards are not tied to the quality of the provided measurements, the agents do not have any incentive for providing accurate information. However, implementing a reward mechanism that considers the quality of the measurement is difficult because the quality of measurements is not fixed or known ahead of time.
In this paper, we present a framework for constructing contracts for third-party strategic sensors tasked with the acquisition of accurate information. We model the behaviour of each sensor, specifically the effort expended to collect a measurement, in response to the provided incentives using a contract game. In particular, we use these contract games within an averaging estimation scheme. We provide conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the corresponding game. Further, we construct the equilibrium of this game explicitly. We study the properties of the equilibrium with respect to the incentives provided in the contract game. We prove two fundamental properties. The first property provides the minimum required budget for achieving a specified level of the estimation error, while the second one bounds the quality of the estimates for a given budget. We use these fundamental properties to design optimal contracts for information acquisition and sensing. We also note that the efforts of the sensors, at the captured equilibrium, are dominant strategies. That is, even if some sensors are faulty and/or reporting corrupted data, it is in the best interest of each strategic sensor to expend the equilibrium effort. This property makes the detailed mechanism robust to faults and cyber-security threats.
The problem of designing appropriate incentives for agents to truthfully communicate their preferences, most often the parameters of their cost functions, has been for long studied in the economics literature in the field of mechanism design; see, e.g., [6, 7] . In those studies, the central planner wishes to make a social decision after discerning from the agents their fixed and privately-held preferences. This differs from the problem considered here in that the central planner does not seek to recover the private information associated with the effort expended by each sensor, which is not fixed and merely serves as an indicator of measurement quality. In fact, the efforts are functions of the incentives provided by the central planner to elicit higher quality estimates. Our framework is closer in essence to contract design for managers in [8] . However, we do not assume that the effort expended by each agent is revealed to the central planner (through the value of stock, which is a function of the actual effort expended by the manager) and that contracts have only one form of payment. In [8] , the payment is a mixture of a performance bonus (based on possibly miss-reported earnings) and a stock option.
In what follows, the outline of the paper is presented. In Section 2, we introduce the problem formulation in gametheoretic terms. Contracts are constructed in Section 3. Finally, a numerical example is given in Section 4 and concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
Problem Formulation
Consider the case where a central planner wishes to obtain an accurate measurement of a zero-mean 1 random variable x ∈ R by obtaining measurements from n sensors. The sensors need to expend an effort denoted by a i ∈ R ≥0 to measure the variable x. The effort is unknown to the central planner. It determines the quality of the corresponding sensor measurement, which is given by
where w i is a zero-mean random variable with the variance E{w 2 i } = η i (a i ) and η i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is an appropriate mapping that captures the return on the effort expended by the sensor.
Remark 1. Note that Assumption 1 is satisfied so long as the sensors do not have access to each other's measurements and the estimate constructed by the central planner when reporting their measurements. This is satisfied, in the setup of this paper, as we do not allow the sensors to renegotiate their contract with the central planner and update their messages after the estimate constructed by the central planner is revealed. Assumption 2. The mapping η i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is twice continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing.
The pay-off of sensor i, for the measurement that it provides to the central planner, is modelled as
where p i ∈ R ≥0 is a potentially stochastic unit of compensation offered by the central planner to sensor i depending on all the reported measurements, f i : R ≥0 → R is a mapping determining the cost of sensor i investing an effort equal to a i , and α i ∈ R ≥0 is the value-of-compensation from the perspective of sensor i. Here, we adopt the gametheoretic notation that a −i = (a j ) j =i . We assume that the sensors are risk neutral, that is, they wish to optimizē
Throughout the paper, we use incentives of the form p i = π i (y 1 , . . . , y n ) for a given contract π : R n → R n . We use the term contract because, while the compensation mapping π : R n → R n is agreed upon prior to expending the effort and gathering data, the level of compensation p i is determined after the sensors report their measurements. That is, when the sensors agree to participate in this process, they are given a contract for their reports in the future. Moreover, the risk-neutral assumption is only useful/valid if the sensors provide many measurements so that their average returns are well-modelled with the expectation of their cost functions.
Assumption 3. The mapping f i : R ≥0 → R is twice continuously differentiable and strictly increasing.
Definition 1 (Contract Game). A contract game with compensation contract
, that is, n strategic sensors each with the action space R ≥0 and utilityC
as the parameters of the contract game. Now, we can define an equilibrium of the contract game.
Definition 2 (Contract Equilibrium
Let us assume that the central planner employs a simple averaging estimator to extract
The quality of the estimate is given by
Throughout this paper, we assume that the amount of the effort a i expended by sensor i is only known to itself and is, implicitly, a function of the devised compensation contract.
Clearly, having a fixed compensation policy such that p i = c for all a i ∈ R ≥0 and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is not good. This is because, in that case, we haveC i (a i , a −i ) = α i c − f i (a i ) for all a i ∈ R ≥0 . Now, by Assumption 3, we can see that it is in the best interest of the sensor to select a i = 0. This is not the preferable outcome for the central planner in terms of the estimate quality. To fix this issue, we need to make sure that E{p i } becomes a function of a i . This is the topic of the next section.
Compensation Based on Empirical Statistics
Let us select the compensation policy
where γ i , δ i ∈ R ≥0 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are appropriately-selected constants. For this compensation contract, by Assumption 1, we get
and, as a result,
Now, we can prove the following intermediate result.
Proposition 1. Let
Proof. The proof immediately follows by Definition 2, by maximizing (3).
Definition 3 (Symmetric Contract Game). The contract game is symmetric if α i = α, γ i = γ, δ i = δ, f i = f , and η i = η for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4 (Symmetric Contract Equilibrium).
A contract equilibrium (a * i ) n i=1 is symmetric if a * i = a * j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Corollary 1. Any equilibrium of a symmetric contract game is symmetric.
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of set A i in (4) for the case of symmetric contract games.
Remark 2 (Equilibrium vs. Dominant Strategy).
Note that, from the structure of the expected cost function in (3), the best action of sensor i is independent of the actions of the other sensors. Therefore, a * i ∈ A i is a dominant strategy for the sensor, which is stronger than an equilibrium where the sensors do not deviate given that the others do not deviate as well. This means, even if some sensors are faulty and reporting bogus data, it is in the best interest of each strategic sensor to expend the effort a * i ∈ A i . This behaviour makes the estimator robust to individual corruptions. Note that this observation however does not exclude the possibility of the sensors being able to improve their compensation by colluding with each other.
Proof. To show this results, we need to prove that A i = ∅ for all i. Let us define the mapping ξ i : R ≥0 → R such that
We have lim ai→∞ ξ i (a i ) ≥ lim ai→∞ f i (a i ) = +∞, where the inequality follows from that, by definition, η i (a i ) ≥ 0 for all a i ∈ R ≥0 . As a result, for all Ξ ∈ R ≥0 , there ex-
. Now, we may define the set Ω := {a i ∈ R ≥0 | a i ≤ A(Ξ )}. Clearly, the minimizer of ξ i (·) belongs to Ω because ξ i (a i ) > Ξ > ξ i (0) for all a i ∈ R ≥0 \ Ω. Hence, we have A i = arg min ai∈Ω ξ i (a i ). Noting the continuous function ξ i (·) attains its minimum over the compact set Ω, we get A i is non-empty.
Throughout this report, we define mappings f i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 and f i : R ≥0 → R to denote the first and the second derivatives of f i (·), respectively; these exists by Assumption 3. Similarly, we use the notations η i : R ≥0 → R ≤0 and η i : R ≥0 → R to denote the first and the second derivatives of η i (·), respectively, which exists by Assumption 3. For some cases, we can simplify the construction of A i . The next corollary presents one such case.
≥0 is a contract equilibrium if and only if (a
This shows that a i = 0 cannot be a minimizer of ξ i (·). Therefore, the optimizer belongs to the interior of the set R ≥0 and, as a result, it should satisfy
This concludes the proof. 
Proof. First, note that lim a→∞ f (a) = +∞ guarantees the existence of the contract equilibrium according to Proposition 2. Define the set Ω and the mapping ξ i : R ≥0 → R as in the proof of Proposition 2. Note that d 2 ξ i (a i )/da 2 i > 0 and, therefore, ξ i (·) is a strictly convex function. Therefore, the minimizer of ξ i (·) over the convex set Ω is unique.
Let us assume that the conditions of Corollary 2 and Proposition 3 hold. Doing so, we can define the mapping a * i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 to be such that
Following the results of Corollary 2 and Proposition 3, the tuple (a *
is well-defined and is a contract equilibrium for given parameters (γ i ) n i=1 . Proof. First, note that the mapping a * i (·) is differentiable; see Theorem 4 in [9, p. 139] . Taking derivative of (6) with respect to γ i , we get
which follows from Assumption 2 and the inequality
Definition 5. A compensation policy is ex ante individually rational ifC
Note that, in a liberal society, we must use individually rational compensation policies as, within such a society, the sensors are free to leave and, not surprisingly, will leave if there is no hope of receiving compensation in return for their efforts.
Proposition 5. The proposed compensation contract in (2) is ex ante individually rational for a symmetric con-
Proof. Following Corollary 1, we know that the contract equilibrium is symmetric, that is, a * 1 = · · · = a * n = a * . We havē
This concludes the proof.
Under the conditions of Corollary 2 and Proposition 3, we can calculate the total expected budget at the contract equilibrium (a * i ) n i=1 , which is
Now, for symmetric contract games, by the individualrationality condition in Proposition 5, we get
We can generalize this calculation to all ex ante individually rational compensation contracts.
to be an ex ante individually rational compensation contract. Then, the budget for implementing the contract equilibrium (a
Proof. From individual rationality, we know that
As we expect, there is a trade-off between the amount of the budget spent and the quality of the estimate if we wish to consider ex ante individually-rational compensation contracts.
Proposition 7 (Fundamental Budget Requirement).
For any symmetric contract game, the budget for implementing any ex ante individually rational compensation contract with the estimation quality E{ x −x 2 2 } = is lower bounded by B ≥ nf (η −1 ( ))/α.
Proof. In this case, we have a *
Based on Assumption 2, we know that η −1 (·) exists. Hence, if we have a * ≥ η −1 ( ) at the contract equilibrium, then the required level of precision is achieved. Following Proposition 6, the budget for implementing this contract equilibrium is lower bounded by
This completes the proof.
Alternatively, we can prove the following result.
Corollary 3 (Fundamental Performance Limit).
For any symmetric contract game, the estimation quality of any ex ante individually rational compensation contract with the budget constraint B ≥ β is lower bounded by
is very similar to the Cramér-Rao bound for Gaussian estimation problems [10] . This is because of the linear filter used in (1) .
Finally, we show that the lower bound in Proposition 7 is tight and is achieved by the a simple contract of the form (2). Proposition 8. For any symmetric contract game such that lim a→∞ f (a) = +∞ and η (a)f (η −1 ( )) − f (a)η (η −1 ( )) > 0 for all a ∈ R ≥0 , the budget-optimal compensation contract, among the set of all ex ante individually-rational compensation contracts guaranteeing a performance of E{ x −x 2 2 } ≤ , is
is a contract equilibrium. Substituting δ = γ(n − 1) /n + f (η −1 ( ))/α and a * i = η −1 ( ), ∀i, in (7) gives
which is the smallest admissible budget according to Proposition 7.
Numerical Example
Let us consider a scenario in which we ask the sensors to take the measurement of a random variable, e.g., the travel time on a road. Noting that their measurements are noisy the sensors may wish to take multiple samples, calculate their average, and transmit that average to the central planner. However, doing so, they will spend more time in providing their sample. Let the effort a for each sensor be proportional to the amount of the time they spend refining their measurement. We assume that the cost of that effort is given by f i (a) = exp(ϑa). This is because, by spending more time, the will lose other opportunities for earning money while their estimate does not improve that much to result in a far superior return from the central planner. Also, let η i (a) = /( + a) for a constant > 0. This captures the following features: the more time that they spend, the more samples they gather and, hence, the more they can reduce the error of their measurement (which is inversely proportional to the number of the internal samples). We will consider a symmetric contract game.
Let us select the compensation policy π i (y 1 , . . . , y n ) = δ−γ(x−y i ) 2 . Upon satisfying ϑ−αγ[(n−1) 2 /n 2 ]/ < 0, by Corollary 2 and Proposition 3, the unique contract equilibrium (a * i ) Let us consider the case where α = 1. Further, select ϑ = 1 and = 1. For this contract equilibrium to be individually rational, according to Proposition 5, we select δ = γ(n − 1)η(a * i )/n + f (a * i ). Figure 1 illustrates the effort expended by the sen- sors (a), the performance of the estimator (a), and the budget required for implementing the contract equilibrium (c) as a function of γ for various number of participants n. Evidently, the return for adding one extra sensor diminishes with increasing n. Figure 2 shows the required budget versus the quality of the estimate. As we expect, with increasing the budget, we can acquire more accurate information. An interesting observation is that, for a fixed estimation quality, we are better off employing more sensors.
Conclusions and Future Work
We studied the behaviour of strategic sensors in response to compensation for providing accurate information. We modelled the interaction using game theory and presented conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of the contract equilibrium. Using the characterization of the contract equilibrium, we constructed optimal contracts, in terms of the budget, for achieving a certain level of estimation quality.
